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Eight	provisional	lessons	from	Britain’s	handling	of
COVID-19
Four	months	since	the	World	Health	Organisation	declared	COVID-19	a	pandemic,	Sir	Richard
Mottram	outlines	key	lessons	that	can	already	be	drawn	about	the	UK’s	crisis	management
machinery.
Crises	provide	an	illumination	and	an	audit	of	government	capability	and	performance.	It	seems	clear
that	the	UK	government	system	has	performed	poorly	in	comparison	with	other	comparable	countries
in	the	health	aspects	of	the	outbreak.	What	has	gone	wrong	and	what	lessons	can	be	learned?
Lesson	one:	in	Horizon	Scanning,	the	past	may	not	be	a	good	guide	to	the	future
The	UK	has	a	system	for	assessing	risks	through	the	National	Risk	Register	of	Civil	Emergencies.	The	latest
edition,	published	in	September	2017,	highlighted	‘emerging	infectious	diseases’	as	an	increasing	risk.	It	suggested
consequences	might	include	‘several	thousand	people	experiencing	symptoms,	potentially	leading	to	up	to	100
fatalities.’	(In	contrast,	the	estimate	for	pandemic	flu	was	between	20,000	and	750,000	fatalities.)	Such	estimates
are	meant	to	represent	a	reasonable	worst	case.	In	the	case	of	an	emerging	infectious	disease,	the	assessment
appears	to	have	been	driven	by	the	comforting	assumption	that	a	future	case	would	have	a	similar	impact	in	the
United	Kingdom	to	the	outbreak	of	Middle	East	Respiratory	Syndrome	in	2015	or	Severe	Acute	Respiratory
Syndrome	(SARS)	in	2003.
Lesson	two:	risk	assessments	need	to	lead	to	government	action
The	risk	was	nevertheless	recognized	to	be	significant.	The	purpose	of	the	register	is	to	trigger	preparatory	action
for	priority	risks	so	that	planning,	testing	of	plans,	and	other	advance	steps	are	in	place	to	mitigate	the	effects	of	a
risk	crystallizing.	None	of	this	appears	to	have	been	in	place	for	a	coronavirus	outbreak.
Lesson	three:	there	is	no	such	thing	as	‘the	science’
Scientific	advice	rightly	is	embedded	within	the	government’s	crisis	management	machinery	in	support	of	decisions
that	are	ultimately	a	matter	for	Ministers.	An	issue	is	whether	Ministers	understand	the	inherent	limitations	in
scientific	advice,	particularly	when	there	may	be	considerable	uncertainty	about	the	nature	and	dimensions	of	the
problem	being	advised	on,	and	what	this	implies	for	the	choices	they	are	being	asked	to	make.
During	this	crisis,	Ministers	have	referred	to	an	entity	called	‘the	science’	as	justification	for	their	actions	or
inactions,	leading	to	concerns	that	the	blame	for	inadequate	decisions	might	be	laid	at	the	door	of	the	government’s
scientific	and	medical	advisers.	Now	the	minutes	of	the	government’s	Scientific	Advisory	Group	for	Emergencies
(SAGE)	have	been	published,	we	can	see	Ministers	would	appear	not	to	have	been	alone	in	referring	to	an	entity	of
‘the	science’.	For	example,	the	minutes	of	its	thirteenth	meeting	on	Covid-19	on	5	March	record	that:
8.	SAGE	advised	that	the	science	supports	a	combination	of	case	isolation	and	whole	family	isolation	[to
be	implemented	within	1-2	weeks].
9.	The	science	supports	that	a	third	intervention	has	epidemiological	advantages:	to	socially	isolate
those	in	vulnerable	groups	(the	elderly	and	those	with	underlying	conditions)	approximately	2	weeks
after	these	initial	interventions.
Lesson	four:	in	a	pandemic,	the	right	course	is	speed,	speed,	and	more	speed
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Well	before	the	3-4	weeks	envisaged	in	this	timetable	were	up,	SAGE	had	revised	upwards	its	assumptions	about
the	speed	of	spread	of	the	pandemic,	and	appreciated	the	potential	impact	on	NHS	critical	care	capacity.	By	23
March,	drawing	on	SAGE	advice	and	external	modelling,	the	government	had	introduced	complete	lockdown.	This
represented	a	clear	reversal	of	the	approach	that	SAGE	had	been	following	of	looking	to	a	combination	of	isolating
those	infected	and	their	household,	and	the	old	and	the	vulnerable,	while	accepting	the	virus	would	circulate	in	the
rest	of	the	population.	It	is	denied	that	a	strategy	of	seeking	‘herd	immunity’	was	ever	pursued,	though	it	is	clear	that
SAGE	was	convinced	that	countries	such	as	China,	where	heavy	suppression	was	underway,	would	experience	a
second	peak	once	measures	were	relaxed.	If	not	‘herd	immunity’	what	was	the	strategy	being	pursued	by	SAGE
and	by	Ministers?
There	is	a	theme	in	SAGE’s	deliberations	of	waiting	for	better	data	before	acting	which	might	be	said	to	be
understandable	given	the	magnitude	of	the	social	and	economic	consequences	of	lockdown.	But,	if	experience
elsewhere	suggested	such	action	was	inevitable,	then	why	wait,	given	the	consequences	of	delay	in	relation	to
exponential	case	growth?	Linked	to	this	were	occasional	references	to	learning	from	developments	in	other
countries	and	the	actions	of	their	governments	but	no	real	sense	we	might	be	guided	by	the	experience	of	others
(whether	in	the	initial	stages	learning	from	those	who	had	the	benefit	of	having	successfully	tackled	SARS	or	later
from	our	European	comparators.)
Lesson	five:	how	a	problem	is	framed	has	consequences.
The	message	of	lockdown	was	clearly	expressed:	Stay	Home>Protect	the	NHS>Save	Lives.	But	protecting	the
NHS	and	saving	lives	were	not	the	same	thing.	Steps	to	free-up	beds	by,	for	instance,	discharging	un-tested
patients	into	care	homes	had	outcomes	in	terms	of	deaths	that	might	be	regarded	as	predictable.	The	government
did	not	publish	a	comprehensive	strategy	for	the	care	home	sector	until	15	April.	Throughout	the	crisis,	the	sector
appeared	to	be	second	in	the	government’s	priorities.
Lesson	six:	orchestration,	not	top-down	control
In	any	significant	crisis	there	are	challenges	in	linking	together	vertically	the	top	of	government,	intermediate	layers,
and	the	front-line	and	in	horizontal	co-ordination	–	whether	across	Whitehall	or	at	local	level,	or	between
government	and	actors	in	the	private	and	third	sectors.	It	would	require	more	space	to	do	justice	to	these	issues.
But	areas	that	will	attract	attention	in	any	lessons-learned	exercise	include	the	following:
Public	Health	England	struggled	in	initial	case-handling,	including	testing,	and	because	of	inadequate
stockpiles	of	equipment.	More	generally	it	is	unclear	why	earlier	action	was	not	taken	to	build	or	buy-in
capacity	in	shortage	categories.
Familiar	problems	have	emerged	in	public	procurement	and	project	and	programme	management.	The	default
has	appeared	to	be	to	suggest	direct	ministerial	control	or	that	reporting	directly	to	the	Prime	Minister	is	the
answer.	The	system	was	to	be	galvanised	into	action	by	setting	arbitrary	targets,	sometimes	with	highly
challenging	deadlines.	Some	were	missed	or	their	achievement	appeared	to	be	falsified.	The	government
appears	to	have	forgotten	the	rule	for	generating	confidence	and	trust:	‘Under-promise	and	over-perform’.
There	are	numerous	examples	of	the	government	failing	to	engage	with	or	consult	properly,	whether	internally
(with	the	devolved	administrations	or	local	government	in	particular)	or	externally.
Lesson	seven:	the	Civil	Service	is	not	the	problem
Some	of	the	issues	above	may	well	have	arisen	because	of	weaknesses	in	capability,	in	particular	in	parts	of	the
civil	service.	Equally,	other	parts	of	the	civil	service	seem	to	have	performed	well	in	policy-making	and	delivery	(for
example,	the	Treasury	and	the	Department	for	Work	and	Pensions.)	Any	lessons-learned	exercise	–	in	contrast	to	a
blame-shifting	manoeuvre	–	needs	to	look	at	our	whole	system	of	government	and	the	contributions	of	Ministers,
special	advisers,	and	civil	servants,	and	of	Parliament.
Lesson	eight:	the	British	way	in	crisis	management	is	not	‘world-leading’
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No	ministerial	statement	or	comment	by	a	government	spokesperson	seems	complete	without	a	reference	to	the
‘world-leading’	or	‘world-beating’	nature	of	the	UK’s	handling	of	the	topic	at	hand.	The	handling	thus	far	of	the
COVID-19	crisis	should	be	an	important	corrective	to	this	mindset.	In	reality,	we	have	much	to	learn	from	other
countries.	A	useful	discipline	would	be	to	ban	such	phrases	from	public	discourse	while	the	lessons	to	be	learned
from	recent	events	are	exposed	and	acted	upon.
__________________
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